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EAST-ADL is a domain-specific modelling language for the 
engineering of automotive embedded systems. The language has 
abstractions that enable engineers to capture a variety of 
information about design in the course of the lifecycle — from 
requirements to detailed design of hardware and software 
architectures. The specification of the EAST-ADL language includes 
an error model extension which documents language structures that 
allow potential failures of design elements to be specified locally. 
The effects of these failures are then later assessed in the context of 
the architecture design. To provide this type of useful assessment, a 
language and a specification are not enough; a compiler-like tool 
that can read and operate on a system specification together with its 
error model is needed. In this paper we integrate the error model of 
EAST-ADL with the precise semantics of HiP-HOPS — a state-of-
the-art tool that enables dependability analysis and optimization of 
design models. We present the integration concept between EAST-
ADL structure and HiP-HOPS error propagation logic and its 
transformation into the HiP-HOPS model. Source and destination 
models are represented using the corresponding XML formats. The 
connection of these two models at tool level enables practical EAST-
ADL designs of embedded automotive systems to be analysed in 
terms of dependability, i.e. safety, reliability and availability. In 
addition, the information encoded in the error model can be re-used 
across different contexts of application with the associated benefits 
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for cost reduction, simplification, and rationalisation of 
dependability assessments in complex engineering designs. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Model-based engineering has become increasingly important in managing 
the ongoing advances in functionality and complexity of modern safety-critical 
embedded systems. There is a growing development in domain-specific 
modelling languages to support the design lifecycle from the early 
requirements stage up to the detailed hardware and software designs. Such 
languages aim to address the challenges arising from the management of 
nominal system design, design refinement and evolution, as well as the safety 
requirements and error behaviours.  
EAST-ADL (EAST-ADL, 2014) is an Architecture Description Language 
(ADL) which provides an integrated and systematic support for modelling of 
automotive systems. EAST-ADL facilitates multi-level abstractions which 
allow design and engineering concerns to be better managed. The specification 
of the EAST-ADL includes an error model which describes potential failures 
of the design elements. Specifications using the error model can be used to 
assess of the effects and propagations of these failures through the system. To 
perform this assessment, however, a connection between the modelling 
language and a model-based safety analysis tool needs to be established.  
Consideration for safety and reliability has been crucial throughout the 
development of safety critical systems. Various model-based safety analysis 
techniques (Joshi et al., 2006; Sharvia & Papadopoulos, 2011) have been 
proposed and developed throughout recent years. These techniques can be 
based on architectural decomposition of the system, e.g. the HiP-HOPS 
technique (Papadopoulos, et al., 2001), or they may be based on formal 
verification. such as the FSAP-NuSMV model checking approach (Bozzano & 
Villafiorita, 2006). Both categories of technique aim to identify the causes of 
failures, derive and refine safety requirements, and assist in the development of 
safety solutions. Some techniques have been extended with additional 
capabilities, e.g. HiP-HOPS is also capable of architectural optimisation and 
automatic allocation of safety requirements.  
Integration between emerging domain-specific languages and a mature 
model-based safety analysis technique will be greatly beneficial in enabling 
robust and consistent automotive system development and assessment. In this 
paper, we extend the error model of EAST-ADL with the semantics of HiP-
HOPS to enable safety analysis to be performed on EAST-ADL models. This 
extension will pave the road for exploiting many of the capabilities provided by 
HiP-HOPS, including reliability analysis, availability analysis, safety analysis 
through Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA), multi-objective optimization, and safety requirement allocation, all 
using data gathered from the EAST-ADL model. The information contained in 
the EAST-ADL error model can be re-used across different contexts of 
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application with the associated benefits of cost reduction, simplification and 
rationalisation of dependability assessments in complex engineering designs. 
The integration requires translation of the models in the automotive 
domain to models in the safety analysis domain, i.e., a transformation of the 
EAST-ADL error model to a corresponding HiP-HOPS model. The concrete 
source and destination models are both represented in XML-based formats, 
which are EAXML and HiP-HOPS XML respectively. A translator tool has 
been developed to perform the transformation between these models. This 
involves a conceptual semantic mapping between the domains as well as 
representation of the output in the target concrete syntax (i.e. HiP-HOPS). The 
connection of these two models at tool level enables various dependability 
analyses to be performed on practical EAST-ADL designs in an incremental 
and iterative manner.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses 
the different levels of abstraction in EAST-ADL, and their contribution to the 
design lifecycle. The Error Model is introduced and the main elements of the 
Error Model are briefly discussed. Section 3 discusses the main processes in 
HiP-HOPS, as well as its contribution in providing automated safety and 
reliability analysis. The main elements of the HiP-HOPS XML interface are 
also presented. Section 4 presents the semantic mapping between EAST-ADL 
and HiP-HOPS models. Then, the translation process and algorithm are 
explained. Section 5 of this paper presents a small case study to illustrate the 
transformation.  Section 6 presents our conclusions and outlines future works.  
 
 
EAST-ADL  
 
EAST-ADL provides a comprehensive approach for the modelling of 
automotive embedded systems. It captures requirements in a standardized form 
and covers design aspects such as vehicle features, analysis functions, 
communications, and software and hardware components. EAST-ADL 
contains multiple layers of abstractions which allow the system to be modelled 
from different viewpoints.  The layers of abstractions are illustrated in the 
figure below. This provides separation-of-concerns and enables effective 
quality management. It also provides traceability relations which allow an 
element to be traced from feature to components in hardware and software.  
The four principle abstraction layers are the Vehicle level, Analysis level, 
Design level and Implementation level (Blom, et al., 2012).  
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Figure 1. EAST-ADL Abstraction Level 
 
 
The Vehicle level model provides the top-level definition of an embedded 
system by capturing its externally visible functionality. The Technical Feature 
Model at this level represents the content and property of the vehicle, without 
going into its realization. For dependability engineering, this top-level system 
description becomes the basis of the analysis of the safety objectives, for 
example via Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA).  
The Vehicle level is later refined at the Analysis level. The Functional 
Analysis Architecture (FAA) at this level captures the underlying system input 
and output functions as well as the control functions. It does not consider any 
implementation details. For dependability engineering, the Functional Analysis 
Architecture becomes the basis for the assessment of functional anomalies. 
System safety objectives are mapped into more detailed functional safety 
requirements.  
The Analysis level is then refined for system realization, and the choices 
of technologies for computation and communication are considered. This 
implementation-oriented aspect is covered at the Design level. System models 
at this level typically consist of a Functional Design Architecture (HDA) and 
Hardware Design Architecture (HDA). The Functional Design Architecture 
defines the grouping and partitioning of functions, and takes into account 
aspects such as efficiency, legacy of usage, reusability, and hardware 
allocations. It also specifies the structure of the system function to be 
implemented. For dependability engineering, it becomes the basis for the 
analysis of error behaviours of software and hardware components. This leads 
to the refinement of functional safety requirements to more detailed technical 
safety requirements. The Hardware Design Architecture describes the target 
hardware platform and captures the constraints of the abstract functions to the 
platform.   
The Implementation level provides the specification of software 
components based on AUTOSAR (AUTOSAR, 2013). Traceability is 
supported at all levels from Implementation level to Vehicle level. For 
dependability engineering, the technical safety requirements are further refined 
into software and hardware requirements. EAST-ADL allows requirements to 
be traced to the related design solutions, verification and validation cases, and 
other interconnected requirements.  
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EAST-ADL has also been recently extended with a Behavioural 
Description Annex (Chen, et al., 2013) which captures various behavioural 
concerns. This includes behavioural modelling and analysis, which are 
important in requirement engineering, architectural design, and design 
verification and validation.  
 
Error Model  
EAST-ADL allows safety requirements and concerns (such as hazards, 
faults, and failures etc) to be modelled and analysed in parallel to the 
development of the nominal system model. For this, an Error Model Type is 
introduced to support the annotation and management of error behaviours, and 
thus allow the traceability from error behaviours to system functions or 
components.  
The composition of the Error Model Type is achieved through the Error 
Model Prototype. The Error Model Prototype represents the instantiation of an 
Error Model in a specific context and reflects the composition of the nominal 
system design. Each Error Model allows description of anomalies in term of 
estimated faults and failures. A Fault Failure entity is used to declare the 
actual value of an anomaly, usually with a certain enumeration type, for 
example {omission, commission}. The modelling of failure propagation is 
facilitated through ports. A Fault InPort describes the faults a target can 
receive from its environment or other Error Models. a Failure OutPort 
describes the failures which may occur and propagate to the environment or 
other Error Models. These ports can be traced to the corresponding 
communication ports of functions or components in the nominal system 
architecture.  
An Error Model Type may have both Internal Faults and Process Faults. 
An Internal Fault represents an internal malfunction which causes errors when 
activated, whereas a Process Fault represents a permanent systematic fault. The 
Error Model Type may also contain Failure Logic, which is used to describe 
how output failures of a system function or component occur in relation to its 
internal faults or faults propagated from its inputs. The formalism used to 
express the Failure Logic depends on the analysis techniques being applied.  
Fault Failure Propagation Links are used to describe error propagations 
across Error Models. These propagation links connect an output failure port 
(i.e., Failure OutPort) with an input fault port (i.e., Fault InPort) with shared 
variable semantics.  
Figure 2 illustrates the domain model for the Error Model:  
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Figure 2. Domain Model for the EAST-ADL Error Model Type (EAST-ADL, 
2014) 
 
 
HiP-HOPS 
 
Hierarchically Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation Studies (HiP-
HOPS) (Papadopoulos, et al., 2001)is a safety analysis technique which 
automatically performs Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Failure Mode and 
Effect Analysis (FMEA) on the basis of a system model. HiP-HOPS models 
the propagation of failures by synthesizing hierarchical component failure logic 
into a network of fault trees. There are three main phases in HiP-HOPS:  
 
 a model annotation phase, during which the analyst annotates the 
system architecture with component-level descriptions of failure 
behaviour; 
 a fault tree synthesis phase, during which HiP-HOPS 
automatically synthesizes system-level fault trees to model the 
propagation of failures through the system; 
 and the analysis phase, during which HiP-HOPS performs FTA 
and FMEA analyses on the basis of the failure propagation model 
it has generated.  
 
The model annotation phase provides information on how each individual 
component can fail. This local failure information takes the form of a set of 
logical expressions which are manually added to each component. These local 
failure expressions describe how failures of the component's outputs can be 
caused by a combination of failures received at the component's inputs and/or 
by failure modes (internal malfunctions) of the component itself. Common 
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cause failures are also supported, as are failures propagated via other means, 
e.g. from allocated components. In this way it is possible to model more 
sophisticated scenarios — for instance, the effects on a software function when 
the hardware processor executing that function fails. 
The synthesis phase produces an interconnected network of fault trees 
which link system-level failures (i.e., failures of the system's output functions) 
to component-level internal failures by using the model topology and 
component failure information. These fault trees show how the component 
failures propagate from one component to another and how ultimately they 
may affect the wider system, whether individually or in combination with other 
component failures.  
In the analysis phase, the synthesized fault trees are analysed and an 
FMEA is generated. Both qualitative and quantitative analysis can be 
performed depending on the amount of information provided. Qualitative 
analysis is performed to obtain a list of minimal cut sets, which represent the 
necessary and sufficient combinations of failure modes required to cause every 
system failure in the model. A multiple failure mode FMEA is also produced, 
which shows both direct effects of failure modes on the system as well as the 
further effects of the failure modes (i.e., the effects a failure mode can have on 
the system when it occurs in conjunction with other failure modes). Results are 
available in a variety of formats, including spreadsheets and HTML files that 
can be conveniently displayed through a web browser.  
In a design development lifecycle, the automated nature of HiP-HOPS 
supports an iterative and efficient safety analysis approach. FTA and FMEA 
are both traditionally performed as a manual process, and in the context of 
large complex systems, they may become laborious and error-prone. The 
automatic synthesis of FTA and FMEA information by HiP-HOPS alleviates 
the pressure for safety analysts and helps ensure that safety analysis results are 
synchronized with each new iteration of the system design model. The results 
from these analyses help identify the weak points in the system designs and 
allow problems to be addressed earlier in the design lifecycle. This contributes 
to a more robust, consistent, and effective process. 
HiP-HOPS can also assist in the making of design decisions by providing 
capability for multi-objective optimization to achieve more efficient 
architectural configurations. Design decisions often need to address conflicting 
requirements, e.g. the requirement to maximize dependability and minimize 
cost. When multiple possible architectures involving different subsystem 
configurations and component alternatives can fulfil these various 
requirements, a large number of different design options become available. 
Identification of the most dependable design with the lowest cost will therefore 
involve a large search space, often one too large to be explored manually. 
Furthermore, there is often no single 'optimal' design solution, especially when 
requirements conflict (as dependability and cost often do). In this case the 
designer must find a suitable solution which achieves a satisfactory trade-off 
between dependability and cost. Multi-objective optimization is valuable in 
such situations as it rapidly identifies balanced trade-off solutions. HiP-HOPS 
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automates this optimization process and therefore helps with the identification 
of a suitable or optimal architecture design. More discussion on multi-objective 
optimization can be found in Adachi et al. (2011) and Mian et al. (2014).  
 
HiP-HOPS Error Model 
The HiP-HOPS error model follows the semantics defined in (Walker, et 
al., 2013). The top most element of the HiP-HOPS error model structure is the 
Model, which represents all views of the system under analysis and thus 
encapsulates all other data. Within the Model is a hierarchical structure of 
subsystems and components, represented in figure 3 below:  
 
Figure 3. Model Representation in HiP-HOPS (Walker, et al., 2013) 
 
 
Each Model can contain one or more Perspectives of a system. A 
Perspective is a particular view of a system. This allows separation of concerns 
between software and hardware perspectives in the same way that EAST-ADL 
has a separate FDA and HDA models in its Design level. It is also possible to 
create a HiP-HOPS model with a single, default perspective containing both 
hardware and software elements if preferred.  
Within each Perspective is a top-level System element, representing the 
system being studied. The System contains a set of Components and a set of 
Lines connecting these components together. Components may contain their 
own System elements (via Implementations), which in turn contain 
subcomponents, and thus subsystem hierarchies can be represented. 
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Components are the main elements of the system hierarchy and describe 
concrete components or abstract functions in the system.  
Connections between Components are modelled by means of Ports and 
Lines. Each Component has a set of input and output Ports which define the 
interface for that Component. These Ports can then be connected to Ports of 
other Components by one or more Lines. Generally speaking, Ports are defined 
as either inputs or outputs, although HiP-HOPS also supports bi-directional 
ports (i.e., serving as both inputs and outputs). 
A Component must also define one or more Implementations. These 
represent different concrete implementations or versions of a given component 
or function, i.e., different ways of fulfilling the functionality defined by the 
Component's interface. For example, components from different manufacturers 
could be represented by different Implementations in HiP-HOPS. Different 
Implementations may have different child Systems, allowing complex 
alternative hierarchies with different structural or behavioural characteristics to 
be modelled. 
The Implementation is the model element that contains the failure data 
(and thus different Implementations of a Component may have different failure 
behaviour as long as it still meets the interface for that Component). In general, 
failure data is represented as a set of Basic Events and a set of Output 
Deviations. 
Basic Events are the basic failures of a system and typically represent 
individual component failure modes. They are defined internal to a component 
and may contain optional quantitative failure information (e.g. failure rates and 
repair rates).  
An Output Deviation represents an error or fault propagated from an 
output of a component. They are defined by a failure class and a specific 
output Port; failure classes represent different types of failure possible at a 
given output. For example, one may have omissions and commissions of a 
given output, or value failures such as "too high", "too low", "too early", "too 
late" etc, all associated with each output port. 
The other aspect of an Output Deviation is its cause, which is represented 
by a Boolean expression that links Input Deviations (i.e., failures propagated to 
the inputs of the Component) and internal failure modes of the component. For 
example, an Output Deviation "omission of signal" from a given component 
may be caused by internal failure of that component or a corresponding 
omission of input to that component: thus "Omission-Signal = InternalFailure 
OR Omission-Input". 
If an Output Deviation is flagged as a system output, then it serves as an 
Output Deviation for the system as a whole and will act as the starting point of 
an analysis by becoming the top event of a fault tree.  
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Transformation of EAST-ADL Models to HiP-HOPS Models  
 
Semantic Mapping between EAST-ADL and HiP-HOPS  
The first step in the model transformation process is to establish the 
semantic mapping between the two models. This enables the entities in the 
EAST-ADL model to be translated to corresponding elements in the resultant 
HiP-HOPS model. 
The semantic mapping between EAST-ADL and HiP-HOPS is 
summarized in the following table 1:  
 
Table 1. Semantic Mapping between EAXML and HiP-HOPS XML 
EAST-ADL HiP-HOPS 
Error Model Type System 
Error Model Type.Parts.Error Model Prototype System or System.Component 
Error Model Type. ExternalFault.Fault In Port System.Component.Ports 
Error Model Type.Failures. Failure Out Port System.Component.Ports 
Error Model Type. 
FaultFailureConnectors. Propagation Link 
System.Lines 
Error Model Type. Internal Fault 
System.Component. 
Implementation.FailureData. 
BasicEvent 
Error Model Type. 
ErrorBehaviour.ErrorBehaviourDescription.Failure 
Logic Expression 
System.Component. 
Implementation.FailureData. 
OutputDeviation 
 
The transformation concerns a number of different aspects: the structural 
transformation, transformation of component specific behaviour, and the inter-
component failure propagation. EAST-ADL models and HiP-HOPS models are 
structurally different. A successful transformation must preserve the semantics 
of the original model but change the structure of the model to match the target 
model format. (Biehl, et al., 2010) highlights the fact that EAST–ADL follows 
the concept of initially declaring types and referencing to the declaration from 
each point of use; HiP-HOPS however, couples declaration of a type and its 
usage. In HiP-HOPS, the types are declared at the same point as they are used, 
and therefore during transformation, the declarations have to be included at 
every point of usage. This is particularly demonstrated in the transformation 
between EAST-ADL Error Model Prototype (EMP) and HiP-HOPS 
Component, in which the Error Model Type (EMT) defines the ports, internal 
connection, and error behaviour, while the EMP obtains this information from 
the EMT it was instantiated from. In HiP-HOPS, these are declared for each 
Component.  
 
Transformation Process 
The transformation process starts by iterating through the list of Error 
Model Types (EMT) in the EAST-ADL model. One of the user input 
parameters identifies the top-level EMT which will be used as the basis of the 
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analysis. Information on other EMTs are parsed and stored in the model as they 
will be referenced by an Error Model Prototype (EMP).  
Although EMT maps to a HiP-HOPS System in general, the top-level 
EMT is processed slightly differently. This is because a HiP-HOPS System 
contains only list of components and the lines defining the connection between 
these components. The top-level EMT, however, would also contain Fault 
InPorts and Failure OutPorts. To model this, a top-level Component is created 
to represent the top-level EMT. 
This top-level EMT becomes the basis for the construction of HiP-HOPS 
System. The EMPs contained within the EMT represent the system 
decomposition. The referenced EMT for each of these EMP is subsequently 
checked and if it further contains decomposition, it becomes a subsystem and is 
processed recursively. If it does not have further decomposition, a HiP-HOPS 
Component is created. The construction of HiP-HOPS Components requires 
information on the ports and failure data.  
Input and output ports of the Component can be obtained from Fault InPort 
and Failure OutPort of the referenced EMT. Failure Data in HiP-HOPS is 
contained as part of the implementation. Implementation contains information 
about the failure data of the Component. These are represented as HiP-HOPS 
Basic Events and Output Deviations. The Basic Event is obtained from the 
EMT Internal Fault, and the Output Deviation is obtained from the EMT 
Failure Logic. Multiple Failure Logics are parsed into different Output 
Deviation accordingly.  
While this shows the mapping of EMT to HiP-HOPS Component, 
information on the name of the Component and its connectivity inside the 
System is obtained from the EMP. This is because unlike the internal structure 
(ports and internal connectors) and failure information of the referenced EMT, 
which can be reused, the name and connection of the Component depend on its 
usage context.  
The connectivity of Components inside a HiP-HOPS System is decided by 
the EMP connections. HiP-HOPS Lines connect Components in the same 
subsystem together. Each Line element contains a list of Connections which 
define the connection logic for each port connected to the line. Each 
Connection has a port name and port Expression. Port Expression is a logical 
expression containing names of other ports on the line, Boolean expression or 
specific values. A HiP-HOPS Line and Connection are obtained from the Fault 
Failure Propagation Link of an EMT. The Fault Failure Propagation Link 
connects Failure OutPort with Fault InPort. During the transformation, Failure 
OutPort (source of failure) is mapped to the port expression, and the Fault 
InPort (destination) is mapped to port.  
 
The transformation algorithm can be briefly summarized as follows:  
 
Create top-level component for top-level Error Model 
 
Create HiP-HOPS System for the EMT  
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For every EMP contained in this EMT  
Check if the referenced EMT further contains EMP, If yes:  
Create HiP-HOPS System for the referenced EMT 
(recursive).  This is a subsystem. 
Create HiP-HOPS Component for the EMP, adding the 
subsystem to the Implementation of Component. 
Add the HiP-HOPS Component to HiP-HOPS System. 
If not 
Create HiP-HOPS Component for the EMP.  
Add the HiP-HOPS Component to HiP-HOPS System. 
Create HiP-HOPS Lines elements based on Fault Propagation 
Link  
Add Components and Lines to System 
 
Create HiP-HOPS Component  
Create HiP-HOPS Port 
Create HiP-HOPS Implementation 
Add Port and Implementation to Component 
 
Create HiP-HOPS Port  
 
Create HiP-HOPS Implementation  
Create HiP-HOPS Basic Event  
Create HiP-HOPS Output Deviation  
Add Basic Event and Output Deviation to Implementation  
 
Concrete Representations of the Models: EAXML and HIPX 
The transformation from the EAST-ADL model to a HiP-HOPS model is 
performed through the translation between their corresponding concrete 
representations. EAXML (Blom, 2013) is an XML-based exchange format for 
EAST-ADL models. The EAXML schema is auto-generated from the EAST-
ADL meta-model, and it contains the serialized form of the EAST-ADL meta-
model instances. HIPX is an XML-based exchange format used as input to 
HiP-HOPS and directly represents the HiP-HOPS model structure described 
earlier. A successful transformation of EAST-ADL to HiP-HOPS therefore 
requires transforming an EAXML file into a HIPX file. 
A translator tool called EAXML2HIPXML has been developed to perform 
this transformation. The translator tool was written in Java and constructs 
internal representations of both models. It performs four main tasks: reading of 
the EAXML file, constructing an internal representation of the EAST-ADL 
model, transforming the EAST-ADL model to HiP-HOPS model, and writing 
the output HiP-HOPS XML file.  
  
Reading the EAXML File 
The Java DOM (Document Object Model) API is used for the parsing of 
the XML documents. It is a hierarchy-based parser that loads the XML content 
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into a tree structure and creates an object model of the XML document. The 
translator tool then creates an internal representation of the EAXML model. It 
starts by reading through the list of Error Model nodes contained in the model, 
and for each of these Error Model nodes, information on its Fault InPort, 
Failure OutPort, Internal Fault, Failure Logic, Error Model Prototype, and 
Fault Failure Propagation Link is obtained.  
Fault InPort, Failure OutPort, and Internal Fault are referenced by unique 
names. Multiple failure logics are separated by the semicolon “;” delimiter. 
The Error Model Prototype represents the hierarchical decomposition for the 
Error Model, and contains a reference to the Error Model it instantiates from. 
In the EAXML model, this reference contains the full path of the EAST-ADL 
dependability package. This has been trimmed, and the instantiated Error 
Model is referenced by Error Model name. The Fault Failure Propagation Link 
connects Failure OutPorts with Fault InPorts. Both Failure OutPort reference 
<FROM-PORT-IREF> and Fault InPort reference <To-PORT-IREF> 
references contain information on the port reference and the Error Model 
Prototype reference. These are transformed and stored into a simplified form of 
“Component.Port” which will be easily fitted and recognized in HiP-HOPS 
model.  
 
Writing the HIPX File 
The HiP-HOPS XML Document is produced based on the schema defined 
in (Walker, et al., 2013). The HiP-HOPS XML file supports all the features and 
capabilities of HiP-HOPS. The HiP-HOPS XML file can also be zipped into an 
archive file; HiP-HOPS can read both the full XML file and the packaged zip 
file. The elements in HiP-HOPS XML are discussed in the previous section.  
The DOM parser is used to produce the file. HiP-HOPS elements are 
systematically represented as the XML elements and hierarchically appended/ 
structured.  
 
 
Case Study  
 
This section presents an example of a small standby system modelled 
using EAST-ADL. The simple architecture aims to illustrate the transformation 
process and the safety analysis capabilities obtained from the transformation. 
This system contains a pInputs component which provides inputs (this could be 
sensor reading for example) for the system, a primary component pPrimary 
which processes the inputs and produces a certain output or performs a 
function, and a standby component pStandby which performs identical function 
as pPrimary. These components both contain a subcomponent called ps111. 
The output from pPrimary and pStandby are supplied to another component 
called pCombiner. In a normal working condition, pCombiner will process and 
produce output based on information received from pPrimary. When a failure 
is detected on pPrimary (for example, absence of its input to pCombiner), 
pCombiner switches to use information from pStandby instead.  
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Figure 4. Standby System Model 
 
 
In EAST-ADL, this is modelled through top-level error model S1, which 
contains prototypes pInputs, pPrimary, pStandby, and pCombiner. These 
prototypes are instantiated from other error models. pInputs is instantiated from 
Inputs, pPrimary and pStandy are instantiated from s11, and pCombiner is 
instantiated from Combiner. As s11 contains subcomponent s111, prototypes 
pPrimary and pStandby contain prototype ps111. The following figure 
illustrates the EAST-ADL system hierarchy:  
 
Figure 5. EAST-ADL Model of the System  
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Information on the corresponding error behaviour has been included in the 
model. The following table summarizes the internal faults and failure logics for 
each of the error models. The failure logic defines how failures in the output 
can happen in relation to the internal fault and failure in the inputs. To maintain 
simplicity, each error model is assigned to have one internal fault. Output 
failure in Inputs is caused directly by its internal fault. The output failure in s11 
and s111 can be caused by either internal fault or propagated input. The output 
failure in Combiner can be caused by failure in the input it receives from FL 
together with either a monitoring fault (causing the failure to be undetected and 
standby not activated) or failure of its FR input. An error model prototype 
inherits the error behaviour of the corresponding error model it was instantiated 
from. SystemFailure is directly linked to Failure-CombinedFailure in 
pCombiner.  
 
Table 2. List of Component Internal Faults and Failure Logics 
Component Internal Fault Failure Logic 
s11 s11InternalFault 
Failure-s11Out = Failure-
s11In OR  s11InternalFault 
s111 s111InternalFault 
Failure-s111Out = Failure-
s111In OR 
s111InternalFault 
Combiner MonitoringFault 
Failure-CombinedFailure = 
Failure-FL AND 
(MonitoringFault OR 
Failure-FR) 
Inputs InputBE 
Failure-FL= InputBE; 
Failure-FR = InputBE; 
 
This model has been automatically translated into a HiP-HOPS model 
through the translator tool. The hierarchy between prototypes are flattened and 
information on the error behaviour is included in the HiP-HOPS model in the 
appropriate format.  
Once the HiP-HOPS model is constructed and annotated with failure 
information, FTA and FMEA can be performed. Figire 6 displays the resulting 
fault tree. The analysis results of the FTA is a list of minimal cut sets (as 
shown in figure 7) which identify the combination of component failures which 
cause the top-level failure. This list of minimal cut sets allows safety analysts 
to quickly identify single-point failures (in this case, the internal fault inputBE 
in Inputs is a single point of failure). Single point failure(s) are usually 
unacceptable in safety-critical systems. Critical or undesired combinations also 
highlight weak points in the system design. Their early identification 
subsequently allows these weak points to be targeted and addressed. For 
example, a design modification can be made to introduce fault-tolerant 
mechanisms, or a design decision can be made to use high-reliability 
implementations on critical components.  
Although the structure of this example is small, and the minimal cut sets 
are relatively straight forward, the nature of the integration allows the 
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automated benefits to be applied in larger, more complex systems, where 
manual analyses are often not feasible.  
 
Figure 6. Fault Tree for Standby System 
 
 
Figure 7. Minimal Cut Sets from FTA 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
With the increasing importance of model-based system design in modern 
engineering, there is a growing demand for an integrated safety analysis within 
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the development tool chain. This paper investigated the translation between the 
domain-specific modelling language EAST-ADL and the HiP-HOPS advanced 
dependability analysis tool.  
The transformation between the two models was performed on tool level 
via the corresponding EAXML and HiP-HOPS XML interfaces. A translator 
tool has been developed, the transformation algorithm between the models was 
discussed, and a small example to demonstrate the transformation has been 
presented in this paper.  
The work presented here enables various capabilities of HiP-HOPS, e.g. 
dependability analyses (i.e. safety, reliability, and availability) to be performed 
on automotive system models constructed in EAST-ADL. This benefits the 
system design and development by enabling the iterative and incremental 
safety analysis process throughout the lifecycle.  
Future work in this area include improving the translator tool with 
automated model transformation techniques, for example, by using Eclipse-
based ATLAS Transformation Language (ATL) ((Jouault, et al., 2008), or 
Epsilon Transformation Language (Kolovos, et al., 2008). Work is also in 
progress to enable seamless integration to the larger EAST-ADL Tool 
Platform, EATOP (Reiser & Voget, 2012).  
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